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1. Introduction
Despite the improved health, shift out of physically dangerous or demand-
ing jobs and increased life expectancy of the elderly population of the United
States, their labor force participation rates have declined rapidly in the past
two decades. The first three columns of table 1 document this phenomenon;
the decline was approximately 6 %,18%and40% for men aged 55—59, 60—
64 and 65 + respectively in the period 1957—74. Many factors potentially
contributed to this decline: the growth of income combined with a nontrivial
income elasticity of demand for leisure; technological change; and the rapid
growth of social insurance programs come immediately to mind.
This decline in the labor force participation of the elderly population is of
much more than purely historical interest. It has a variety of implications for
the welfare of the elderly, and the general population. These include the
usual types of labor market distortions, the strain on the financial resources
of the elderly as the average number of years from retirement to death
increases rapidly, the often suggested positive correlation between physical
and psychological problems and labor force withdrawal and the sharp
increase inthe funding of public programs supporting the elderly.
Our purpose in the present study is to analyze a new and rich body of
data on the elderly to study the supply side of the effect of social security on
the early retirement decision. Toward this end, section 2 presents a brief
description of some previous studies of retirement behavior. While each in its
own way has been suggestive, each also (including one by one of the current
authors) has its own set of problems.
Section 3 details the analytical framework of the present study. We
propose several types of data from which one could obtain complementary
tWe wish to thank Takeshi Amemiya for valuable coments; Henry Moore, Louis Garrison
and William Barsky for research assistance; and the Office of Income Security Policy. HEW,
and the American Enterprise Institute for financial support.362 M.J. Boskin and M.D. Hurd, Early retirement
Table 1
Elderly male labor force participation rates and early acceptance of social
security rates.




benefits age 62—64 55—59 60—6465+
1957 91.5 82.9 37.7 N.A.
1958 91.8 83.2 35.7 N.A.
1959 91.3 82.3 34.3 NA.
1960 91.6 81.1 33.3 N.A.
1961 91.8 81.9 31.9 20
1962 91.1 80.3 30.6 29
1963 91.3 80.1 28.4 31
1964 91.1 79.1 27.9 32
1965 90.2 78.0 27.9 32
1966 90.0 78.0 27.2 32
1967 90.1 77.6 27.1 33
1968 90.0 77.3 27.3 33
1969 89.6 75.8 27.3 34
1970 89.5 75.0 26.7 36
1971 88.8 74.1 25.6 39
1972 87.4 72.5 24.4 41
1973 86.5 69.0 22.8 44
1974 85.7 67.9 22.5 46
Whites only.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and H.E.W.
information on the labor supply behavior of the elderly, and three ap-
proaches to analyzing a given body of data. We then propose a new way of
estimating retirement behavior.
Section 4 discusses the data used in this study: the Social Security
Administration's Retirement History Survey.
Section 5reportsour empirical results, estimates of probability of early
retirement and early semiretirement equations.
Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of some of the implications of
the study and suggestions for future research.
2. Previous studies
Social security guarantees elderly retired persons a certain income based
upon their previous covered earnings and taxes some of these benefits back if
earnings exceed a modest amount. Theory tells us little about the overall
effect of social security on retirement; rather it is an empirical issue for at
least three reasons: some workers choose to work enough so that they
receive no payments from social security; some people would retire regard-Mi. Boskin and M.D. Hurd. Early retirement 363
lessof their social security benefits; the effect of changes in the system on
workers who receive benefits is not known. We need to know the distri-
bution of people among the three categories and how the distribution
changes when the system changes.
Previous studies of retirement or the labor force participation rates of the
elderly differ in their conclusions on the effect of social security on retirement
behavior. Retrospective studies of retired workers generally conclude that the
bulk of retirement was due to poor health. While it is undoubtedly correct
that some people retire because of poor health, accepting the conclusion that
most do so from retrospective surveys is hazardous: poor health is certainly
the most socially acceptable reason for retirement, and the health of those
interviewed had, on average, deteriorated since retirement.
Econometric studies of elderly male labor force participation rates across
countries have concluded that social security benefit increases induce retire-
ment [see Pechman, Aaron and Taussig (1968) and Feldstein (1974)]; the
same conclusion is reached by Boskin, who followed the labor force behavior
of a cohort of elderly males for five years. These studies are discussed and
critiqued in greater detail in Boskin.
3. Analytical framework and estimation methods
Our model is a modification of the usual static, two-good, labor supply
under certainty case. While we conceive of the problem under investigation
as potentially embedded in a life-cycle and/or uncertainty context, we believe
that important progress empirically can best be made at present by a more
careful analysis of the usual model. Thus, we want to study changes between
three states: working, semiretirement, and retirement. We define these states
to be working but not receiving social security payments, working but
receiving social security payments, and not working respectively. Obviously,
some people may reduce their hours of work as they age, yet always have
labor incomes that disqualify them from receiving any social security
payments. It is not our focus, however, to investigate how hours of work
change with age; rather, we are interested in how the social security system
influences behavior, and small variations in the benefit structure will not
change the behavior of people who never receive social security payments.
Our goal is to estimate the determinants of the probabilities of people
moving among several states. The probabilities are moving from working to
retirement and from working to semiretirement. We describe the process in
the following way: at age 62 the budget constraint of a worker is changed in
a way that is partly exogenous and partly endogenous: the fact that the
constraint changes is exogenous in that it only depends on the age of the
worker, but the size of the change is endogenous because the benefit depends
on the past earnings history of the worker, and that history is a reflection of364 Mi. Boskin and M.D. Third, Early retirement
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thetastes for work of the worker. In the face of the new budget constraint,
the worker will, on average, maximize utility by choosing one of the three
states we have defined. We hope to find, for example, how the probability of
leaving the state of working for the state of retirement varies when the
benefit level varies, and, therefore, how changes in the benefit levels will
change the working behavior of the elderly population.
The budget constraint of someone of retirement age is given in fig. 1. In
Real
Jncorne
Fig.I. Social security and the budget constraint of the worker (seetext for discussion).
theabsence of social security, this worker would have nonlabor income of y
and a budget constraint given by the segments d and e.Thispreretirement
budget constraint is curved to reflect the progressivity of the federal income
tax. The worker maximizes utility by working I hours. Upon reaching
potential eligibility age the right side of the budget constraint is altered so
that it is now given by the segments y, g, a, b,c andd.1gis the benefit level;
over segment a earnings are not taxed over segment h earnings are taxed at
1A slight increase in monthly benefits is granted for each month past age 62, but before age
65,thatbenefits commence. Since elderly, especially low income, households appear to discount
at rates [Kurz, et al. (1974)] perhaps ten times the 3that renders the present value of benefits
independent of retirement age, we ignore this effect.
i—i 1L21-
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thestatutory 50 percent rate; over segment cearningsare taxed at a 100
percentrate; over segment d no social security payment is made.
There are at least three approaches to the estimation of the probabilities of
movement from one part of the budget constraint to another. In the first,
one specifies a utility function and a distribution of the random component
of tastes. Estimation of the parameters of the utility function and the
parameters of the distribution of the taste component would lead to
knowledge of how the probabilities change when the budget constraint
changes. For many problems this is a useful way to proceed, especially if one
wants to make welfare comparisons. Because we do not want to make
welfare comparisons and we do not have any strong opinion on the form of
the utility function, we do not follow this approach.
In the second approach, one specifies an hours of work function and the
distribution of the random component in hours of work. If that function and
distribution were known, one could calculate the probability that hours of
work would be chosen along each segment of the budget constraint, and how
that probability would vary with changes in the constraint. When the budget
constraint is convex from above, this approach is quite straightforward: the
parameters of both the labor supply function and the distribution of the
random component may be estimated by maximum likelihood once it is
recognized that the wage rate is chosen by the worker according to the
segment of the budget constraint he chooses. If, for example, the random
component has a normal distribution, the distribution of hours along
segment a is truncated normal. Similarly, the likelihood of the cluster of
hours one would expect at the kink between segments a and b can be
specified quite easily. These likelihoods are easy to specify because they only
depend on the slope and intercept of one (or at most two) segment. When
the budget constraint is concave from above, the situation is quite different.
The likelihood that an observation will lie along, say, segment b depends not
only on its slope and intercept, but also on the position of segment d. The
probability that hours of work lie at a certain point of segment b depends on
the slope and intercept of b and on the probability that utility is higher
along b than along d. In the absence of a utility function it is not easy to
specify what that probability is; hence, it is difficult to specify the likelihood
of the sample.
In our approach we estimate directly the probabilities of each change of
state. The probabilities are related to the slopes and intercepts of the
segments through the indirect utility function. Let tbethe tax rate of
earnings of those who are receiving social security payments; wbethe gross
wage rate which we take to be exogenous; g be the social security benefit; y
be nonlabor income which in our data will be composed of dividends and
interest and imputed returns to other assets and debts; tbethe marginal
income tax rate; WR be the event of moving from working to retirement.366 M.d. Bos kin and M.D. Hurd, EarI retirement
Then,
P(WR)_—P(V(w,y+g,u)<U(O,g+y,u) and
U(O, g + y, u)> max utility from semiretirement),
where V is the indirect utility function, U is the direct utility function, w
=w(l—t) andu is a random component resulting from maximization errors
and differences in tastes for work in the population. Direct utility is defined
over the leisure of the husband (the leisure of the wife does not enter because
our subsample does not include any wives who work), an index of real
income which is calculated as money income plus imputed income divided by
a price index derived from geographical information, and the random
component. Indirect utility is the maximum utility that could be achieved if
the budget constraint were linear with wage w and nonlabor income y + g.
gis that nonlabor income which would have to be offered in order that a
person with nonlabor income y and a constant wage w,, would choose hours
of work k g1 may be calculated as thw— T,where T is the actual income tax
paid. The inequalities say that utility at the point chosen before the
modification of the budget constraint (the point, where utility is the greatest
achievable along d) is less than the utility of retirement and that the utility of





V((l —t)w,y+g±s,u) if11 <1((1 —t)w,y+g+s,u)<l2,
U(12, (1 —t5)w12 +y+g+s,u) if12 <1((1 —t)w,y+g+s,u),
where I is the labor supply function and 1 and 12 are the hours of work that
correspond to the breakpoints in the budget constraints. The four in-
equalities give the conditions under which, respectively, utility will be
maximum along a, at the breakpoint between a and b, along b, and at the
breakpoint between b and c. Because 11 depends on the maximum allowable
earnings before income is taxed and upon w and g+y, conditions involving
l may be reduced to conditions on w and g+y: the upper limit on earnings
is constant in the sample (except for the linted variation arising from
regional differences in prices). This also holds for 12, so that all of the
conditions are actually functions of the slopes and intercepts of the segments
of the budget constraints. The maximum utility from semiretirement is,M.J. Boskin and M.D. Hurd, Early retirement 367
therefore,a function of w, g +y, and u. It follows, then, that
P(WR)r h(w, g, + y,w.y+ g).
We do not know what the functional form is, and one may not be derived
without making assumptions about the form of the utility function and
distribution of u. Instead of making these assumptions, we make the rather
strong assumption that
P( WR ) =f(aw,, + f3(g, + y) + yw + b (g + y)).
In later work it would be desirable to relax the assumption that the
argument of f is linear in the variables. We choose f to be the logistic
function to bound the probability between zero and one.
We consider w and y to be exogenous; w,,. g, and g are endogenous. w is
endogenous because the marginal income tax rate depends on tastes for work
as does the probability of retirement. g, also depends on tastes for work
through the marginal tax rate and through actual earnings. g reflects past
earnings, so that if there are persistent tastes for work, g and current tastes
for work will be correlated. In addition, g is only observed for people who
enter retirement or semiretirement. Consideration of the determinants of t, g
and g will indicate how the structure may be identified.
The reduced forms for the marginal tax rate and for g will depend in a
nonlinear way on the wage rate and nonlabor income because of the
nonlinearity of the tax schedule and because they are functions of income.
We approximated these nonlinear functions by fourth-order polynomials in w
and third-order polynomials in nonlabor income. Benefits under social
security depend on the 40 quarters of highest earnings. We have data on past
earnings; however, we feel it is not appropriate to write the reduced form of
benefits to be a function of past earnings due to varying and persistent tastes
for work. That is, someone who worked a great deal in the past and would,
therefore, tend to have high benefits, would also tend to work more today,
and his probability of retirement would be low. This consideration led us to
write the reduced form for benefits as a weighted average of polynomials of
past wage rates and nonlabor income where the weights are the fraction of
time spent at each wage rate.
If the probability of retirement were linear in the right-hand variables,
two-stage least squares would yield consistent parameter estimates: the
exogenous variables would be all the powers of the wage rate, non-labor
income, other taxable income, and past wage rates, and the endogenous
variables would be w,, g, and g. Unfortunately, the linear probability model
suffers from several inadequacies, the most important of which is that it does368 M.J. Boskin and M.D. Hurd, Ear/v reriremenr
notconfine the expected value of the probability to the interval between zero
and one.
Hence, nonlinear estimation is required. In view of the endoeneity of
several variables, nonlinear two stage least squares is a consistent estimator




where f is the logistic function (1/(1 +e)) and u are the residuals. Then
this estimator minimizes
SSR =i2'X(X'X) 1X'2,
where X is our matrix of instrumental variables (i.e. powers of the wage,
etc.).
A more precise description of the estimation method is given in the
Appendix. In brief, we also account for the heteroscedasticity inherent in
probability models by using a nonlinear two-stage generalized least squares
estimator. The numerical calculations are performed using the DFP program
of the Goldfeld—Quandt nonlinear optimization package.
The discussion of the estimation method referred to the probability of
retirement from working. The probability of semiretirement from working
depends on precisely the same variables, so we use the same specification and
methods to estimate that probability equation.
4. The data
The data used in this study are taken from the Longitudinal Retirement
History Survey, a panel study of households whose head (husbands, or single
women) were 58—63 years of age in 1969. The households have been
reinterviewed, insofar as possible, at two year intervals since then. However,
the 1971 wave has only just been released; the 1973 and 1975 waves are still
being processed. Hence, we are dealing with a data set on household heads
in their early sixties. Since much retirement takes place at 65 and some even
later, we must await the subsequent waves of the study to say more about
the full age pattern of retirement.
In order to deal with a relatively homogenous sample and to avoid some
measurement problems, we focus on 62—65 year old white males who were
working in 1969, who were not receiving welfare, who answered the
2Both results derived in Amemiya (1974).Mi. Boskin and M.D. Hurd, Early retirement 369
questionsrelating to the variables of interest and who did not have a
working wife. This winnowed the sample size to about 1,000 households,
since we deleted households with working wives, husband not working, or
nonwhite household head. We hope at a later stage to be able to say
something about the retirement behavior of working women, but thought it
best not to begin with the complications of multiple worker families. Further,
as also reflected in the aggregate data reported in table 1, about 15of this
group had already left the labor force by 1969. Thus, persons with strong
tastes for leisure and extremely serious health problems prior to this age
bracket have been eliminated from the sample, and our results should be
interpreted as conditional on working in 1969.
The key variables used in the study are defined as follows:
Gross wage (w): Hourly earnings before taxes.
Net wage (wa): Hourly earnings after personal income and payroll taxes.
Social security benefit guarantee (g): The annual social security benefit for
the household derived either from actual benefits (adjusted for any
reduction) or from the benefit formula plus an estimate of average monthly
covered earnings as described above.
Nonwage income: Interest, rent, dividends, etc, plus imputed income from
other net assets. The actual tax paid and the marginal tax rate were
constructed from data on the components of taxable income, exemptions,
deductions, and the federal income tax tables.
Age: Dummy variables taking the value one for a specific age and zero
otherwise, as indicated.
Health: A dummy variable taking the value one if respondent answered yes
.to one of several questions indicating a potential health limitation to work.
Compulsory retirement: A dummy variable taking the value one if respondent
worked at a job (in 1969) with a compulsory retirement program.
Family situation: Dummy variables taking the value one if no spouse was
present and one if children were present, respectively.
Sample means and standard deviations for the variables of interest are
presented in table 2.
5. Empirical results
We turn now to our empirical results, estimation of probability of
complete retirement and semiretirement equations and tests of hypotheses
concerning the impact of social security upon early retirement. Recall,
however, that these results are restricted to a very homogenous sample; at
subsequent stages of our work, we will reaggregate to examine the differential
impact of social security on different types of households and workers in370 Mi. Boskin and MD. Hurd, Early retirement
Table 2
Sample means and standard deviations.
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Health 0.19 0.39
Compulsory retirement 0.03 0.18
No spouse present 0.09 0.28
Child present 0.28 0.45
Age=62 0.18 0.38
Age=65 0.13 0.34
Net wage $3.36 1.67
Nonlabor income + tax grant
(x 10) ¶2.09 3.24
Nonlabor income + guarantee
(x 10) $5.74 3.30
Gross wage $4.14 $2.52
Constant 1.0 —
Full retirement =1 0.12 0.32
Semiretirement =1 0.09 0.28
For men age 60—65.
different occupations and industries. Also recall that the fifteen percent of
white males not in the labor force are excluded from our sample, so we have
probably excluded some workers with extremely poor health and others with
greater than average tastes for leisure whose still earlier retirement may have
ben induced partially by the expectation of future social security benefits.
About twenty percent of those working in 1969 either retired or semire-
tired by 1971. Since in 1971 this group was aged 60—65,manymore will
obviously retire before they reach age 65 in subsequent years. With these
provisos in mind, our empirical results are reported in tables 3 and 4. The
Table 3
Probability of retirement.
Variable Coefficient Standard error Change in probability
Bad health 0.95 0.25 0.097
Compulsory
retirement 0.19 0.99 0.019
Single 1.22 0.76 0.124
Wife and child —0.37 0.92 —0.038
Age 62 —0.88 0.57 —0.090
Age 65 —0.03 0.71 —0.003
Benefits
.
(thousands) 0.82 0.37 . 0.083
Gross wage —10.01 0.75 — 1.019
Nonlabor income
(thousands) —0.69 0.45 —0.070
Working wage 12.01 0.76 1.222
Constant —5.68 0.88 —%1.J. Boskin and M.D. Ilurd. Eurl rUrrnt,il 371
Table4
Probabilityof semiretirement.
Variable Coefficient Standard error Change in probability
Bad health 0.14 0.23 0.011
Compulsory
retirement 1.33 0.29 0.107
Single —0.21 0.37 —0.017
Wife and child 0.32 0.23 0.026
Age 62 —0.53 0.21 —0.043
Age 65 0.67 0.18 0.054
Benefits
(thousands) —0.28 0.13 —0.022
Gross wage —0.49 0.25 —0.039
Nonlabor income
(thousands) 0.22 0.13 0.018
Working wage 0.65 0.36 0.052
Constant — 1.18 0.46 —
first column of table 3 gives the results of estimating the coefficients of
P(WR)= 1/(1 +exp(Z'/3)), where the Z-vector includes the wage and social
security benefits as discussed and also variables that describe the health,
family composition and age of the individual. The second column gives the
estimated asymptotic standard errors of the estimated coefficients. The right-
most column gives the probability change for a unit change in the Z-vector,
P/oz =P(1 —P)1. Table 4 gives the results for the probability of going from
working to semiretirement.
The analysis above showed that we could identify the probabilities of
moving among alternative segments of a kinked budget constraint by
parameterizing those probabilities in terms of the slopes and intercepts of the
segments, and that these in turn naturally related to powers of the wage,
nonwage income, etc. Since some slopes and intercepts of the segments of the
budget constraint are transformations of combinations of the basic para-
meters of the earnings test, there is no simple way to infer the effects of these
parameters directly from a single coefficient. We are working on a program
to simulate the effects on retirement of earnings test parameter changes.
Considering the difficulties in measuring some of the variables, in finding
good explanatory variables for some of the right-hand endogenous variables,
and in obtaining independent variation in some of the exogenous variables,
the results are good: most of the estimated coefficients have the expected sign
and are measured fairly precisely. The results on the probability of retirement
are better than on semiretirement; this is not surprising because of the
problems in measuring benefits of people who work.
The results for the probability of retirement are consistent with expectation
in almost every case, and they generally indicate that the change in the372 Mi.Bos&iand MD. Hurd,Ear/v retirement
budgetconstraint caused by the social security system has a considerable
impact on retirement. But rather than discussing the magnitude of the
coefficients, we shall concentrate on the change in the probability of
retirement for a change in the variable. From the logistic probability
equation that derivative is calculated as P( 1 —P)*(estimatedcoefficient). In
our data P is 0.115 for retirement and 0.088 for semiretirement. Of course,
for large changes in the variables, that derivative is not constant due to the
nonlinear nature of the logistic function.
A worker who says that his health limits the amount or kind of work he is
able to do has a considerably greater likelihood of retiring than a healthy
worker: the probability almost doubles, going from 0.115 to (0.115+0.097)
=0.212.Clearly there is a considerable social cost of illness. Because the
questions about health status were asked prior to retirement, the estimate is
not likely to be the result of the self-selection that is found in some labor
supply studies If, in the estimation of labor supply functions, one uses, for
example, the responses concerning health of nonworkers, the estimates may
not be directly interpretable as the effect of health on retirement; it may
simply reflect the systematic tendency of those who prefer to retire earlier to
report that bad health is the reason for their not working.
If there is compulsory retirement at the workers' job, the probability of
retirement increases by about two percentage points. This is not a very large
change. The reason appears to be that many workers prefer to become
semiretired, probably by• changing jobs: the coefficient on compulsory
retirement in the semiretirement equation implies an increase in the pro-
bability of semiretirement of 0.107. This is mild evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that substantial numbers of workers are forced to retire before
they desire to retire. It would be interesting in future work to include
interactions between the age dummies and the compulsory retirement
dummy to discover if there are changes in work before compulsory retire-
ment in anticipation of it.
Single men retire earlier in life than married men with wives, and the
difference is substantial —abouttwelve percentage points. Apparently, when
we hold the financial variables constant, we find that a wife increases the
income requirements of the household, and, therefore, delays retirement of
the husband. Similarly, the presence of a wife and child decreases the
probability of retirement; but, because the husbands are 62—65 years old, the
interpretation of this is not simple. A few of the offspring may be young;
most are surely adults. Not surprisingly, the probability of (especially)
semiretirement, rises with age.
The most interesting and easily interpretable coefficient of the financial
variables are those for benefits and semiretirement, or gross, wage. Benefits is
a measure of the income a worker would receive if he were to retire under
social security, and it includes both nonlabor income from his assets and theMi. Boskin and M.D. Hurd. Earl: retirement 373
socialsecurity benefits. The estimated coefficient is, therefore, directly in-
terpretable as the retirement effect of changes in the benefit schedule. We see
that the effects are substantial: a thousand dollar increase in benefits leads to
an increase in the probability of retirement of about eight percentage points
over the two years of the sample. This is a large increase, almost equal to
our estimated probability of 0.1 15.
Increases in the gross wage lead to a large estimated decrease in complete
retirement. Such an increase rotates segment a upward and makes complete
retirement less likely. The indicated change in probability is a point estimate
at the observed probability, and would change substantially if the logistic
function were evaluated for large changes in the gross wage.4
The nonlabor income variable represents the intercept of the pre-social
security linearized budget constraint. The interpretation is that the in-
troduction of social security benefits will have a smaller effect on the
retirement behavior of people with high nonlabor income than on the
behavior of people with low nonlabor income. In terms of the budget
constraint diagram, fig. 1, we see that a high intercept of the linearized
budget constraint means that the budget constraint will not be altered
greatly by social security; therefore, our estimated negative coefficient is
consistent with our expectations.
The working wage is (1 —t)wwheret is the marginal tax rate. The
estimated coefficient on working wage is not of the expected sign: an increase
in the working wage rotates upward the linearized budget constraint. This
would, as in the case of nonlabor income, make the part of the budget
constraint due to social security less important, and hence one would expect
to find fewer retirements among high wage workers than among low wage
workers. Our result is surely due at least in part to the high collinearity
3As explained in the Appendix, the estimation was done in two rounds: in the first round, the
right-hand endogenous variables including benefits were treated as if they were exogenous: in the
second round, which gave the final results, they were considered to be endogenous. In the first
round the coefficient on benefits was negative, indicating that people with large potential benefits
tend to retire later than people with small benefits. This conforms to our prior beliefs that the
variation in benefits is partly caused by variations in the tastes for work: someone who
relatively prefers to work will have worked more, will have higher benefits, and will be less likely
to retire than someone who prefers to work less. As far as we know, this is the first study to
consider benefits to be endogenous, which may explain why some other studies have not been
able to find a substantial impact of social security on retirement.
4The semiretirement wage coefficient is very collinear with the working wage: the estimated
correlation is over 0.99. (Of course, the high collinearity is indicated by the large standard
error.) In ordinary least squares estimation this only causes an increase in the variance of the
estimates; the estimators are still unbiased and Consistent. In this kind of nonlinear estimation,
the estimators are consistent provided a global minimum of the objective function is found;
however, high collinearity of the estimators of the different parameters makes it sery difficult to find the
global minimum with the numerical routines that are available. Even though our numerical routines
indicate that alocal minimum was found to a high level of accuracy. we prefer to interpret the result as
indicating a substantial effect on retirement. but not he too insistent on the esact magnittid374 M.J. Bskinand M.D. flurd,Earli' retirement
between this estimate and that of the semiretirement wage. Another cause is
the difficulty in measuring the working wage: the only difference between it
and the semiretirement wage is the marginal income tax rate. We have used
the standard tax tables to measure the tax rate; but, this is undoubtedly not
completely accurate for this population, many of whom itemize deductions.5
The equation for probability of semiretirement does not give as many
estimates that conform to expectations as the retirement equation. We think
that this is primarily due to two problems in the data: first it is difficult to
define semiretirement. Our definition requires both labor income and social
security income in 1971. Clearly someone who retires fully part of the way
through 1971 will improperly be classified as semiretired rather than retired.
Further, since benefits are on a monthly basis, some persons may fully retire
'for a few months' then work full time for a while, etc. Second, the calculation
of benefits is rather unsure for the semiretired: essentially we use the
observed social security payments, labor earnings and the implicit social
security tax rate to find what the benefits would be if the worker were to
retire completely. Unfortunately, there is a great deal of error introduced by
this process: for example, we cannot be sure we have found the correct
segment of the budget constraint. Nevertheless, until the data are better, this
seems to be the best that can be done.
The coefficients on the first four variables have the expected signs. The
most interesting is that on compulsory retirement; as was mentioned above,
many workers seem to be unwilling to retire completely if their jobs have
compulsory retirement.
The coefficients on the four financial variables, while generally much
smaller than the coefficients on the corresponding variables in the full
retirement equation, have signs which are contrary to expectation. This is
due both to the collinearity among these variables and the measurement
problems mentioned above. When viewed simultaneously with the estimated
coefficients from the complete retirement equation, the results clearly indicate
a substantial net effect of social security on leaving full-time work for men in
their early sixties.6 We conclude, however, that a more precise examination
of semiretirement and its causes awaits more and better data. Fortunately,
51t is probably useful to point Out that our considering the marginal income tax rate to be
endogenous eliminates a problem found in some labor supply studies and which would explain
the coefficient on the working wage. Had we used the observed marginal wage rate, high
marginal wage rates would be associated with people with low tax rates who, therefore, worked
less than average. If the variations in work are due to differences in tastes for leisure, we would
expect those people to retire early; thus, we would find a positive correlation between the
working wage and the probability of retirement caused by variations in tastes.
6We obtained estimates of an equation for the probability of moving from working to either
semiretirement or to retirement. These results are about the same as those of the semiretirement
equation. Of course, the data have the same deficiencies as the data which were used in the
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subsequent waves of the Retirement History Survey should enable some
averaging over variables and more precise measurement of semiretirement;
further, these data will soon be merged with the individuals' social security
earnings records, which should reduce the measurement error in social
security benefits.
6. Conclusion
Our estimation procedure proves promising. While we could overcome
some of the problems, e.g. collinearity between working and semiretirement
wages, mentioned above if we imposed a particular utility or labor supply
function on the data, we have been able to uncover a strong influence of
social security on even early retirement. Some of the provisions clearly
induce retirement; for others, the effects are more complex and depend upon
the interaction of several aspects of the program.
In addition to examining a larger sample partitioned in different ways, we
hope to extend our results in several directions. First, our estimates can be
used to translate the probability of retirement in the two-year period into
probabilities of being retired by age 65 (which, of course, is a much larger
probability).
Second, equations such as those reported above in principle can only be
used to estimate the effect of changes in the parameters of the social security
system, and hence the budget constraint of the worker, on the retirement
probabilities of a worker with specified values of the variables. In order to
calculate such effects on the total population, we must specify the multi-
variate frequency distribution of the elderly and integrate the effects over the
ranges of these variables. Using typical or mean values can be misleading;
for example, the average response can be quite different than the response at
the average values.
Finally, we note the desirability of exploring more fully than we have been
able to do thus far such potentially important areas of research as the
heterogeneity in the population,7 the insurance aspects of social security and
the demand for labor services of the elderly population.
Appendix
Let y =1 if an individual moves from working to retirement, and y =0
otherwise. We specify that if the budget constraint were exogenous
P(y= 1B)=1+e=f(B),
where B describes the exogenous budget constraint. However, we want to
allow the budget constraint to be endogenous due to variations in tastes for
'See Hall and Heckman and Willis.376 M.J.Boskin and M.D. Hurd, Earl1 retirement -
workwhich will influence both social security benefits through past work
habits and the marginal tax rate, and the probability of retirement. If the
variables determining the observed budget constraint are Z, we specify that
P(Y1Z)1f(Zy)g(Z).
where we expect that y will not be the same as /3. We can write j'=f(Zf3)
+ u. If Z has the reduced form Z =Xc+ V, one form of the nonlinear two-stage
least squares estimator is the /3 that minimizes (v—f(Z18))'X(X'X)'X'(y—
f(Z/3)).This estimator is consistent but not efficient because u given Z
is not homoscedastic. In fact,
E(uZ)=(1 —f(Z$))g(Z)— f(Z/3)(1 — g(Z)) = g(Z)—f(Z/3),
and






Therefore, we employ a two-step method: in the first step we estimate y
from the logit equation P(y= 1Z)=f(Zy). These are the estimates of the
determinants of retirement taking the observed budget constraint to be
exogenous. We then form
P2()(1—P2())
L o
whereP()=f(Z). On the second step we minimize in /3,
(y—f(Zf3))'1X(X'X1X'1(y—f(Z/3)).
to yield ,wherec'(uZ)='.
This amounts to weighting each observation by 1/,J[P(1 —P)]Mi. Boskinand M.D. Hurd, Early retirement 377
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